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 December 9, 1959
What a fateful day for BMW. It is the key point that sums up the company's postwar history, and perhaps even its entire automotive history. It is highly questionable whether, in the prewar period, the company
was able to at least break even solely through the sale of cars, even if motorcycles are included in the count. Didn't the production of aircraft engines play a crucial role?
They no longer existed, nor did the Eisenach plant. Instead, with the exception of the Isetta, the cars were nothing but flops, beautiful ones like the 507 too, but all of them, in one way or another, financial
disasters. The last one was the BMW 600. BMW was facing bankruptcy, and investors a total loss. That was when Friedrich Flick, a major shareholder of Daimler-Benz, and Hermann-Josef Abs,
head of Deutsche Bank, announced a takeover bid, even in a letter to the DB workforce, before the decisive shareholders’ meeting.
It was already becoming clear at this stage what threatened BMW in the event of a takeover by Daimler-Benz. They wanted to use the plant to reduce their excess capacity, with BMW serving as an assembly
plant for Mercedes, which would had also mean losing the latest 700 model and presumably even the brand name. Shareholders would also have been disadvantaged, because under the terms of the
takeover, their shares would have been worth only half as much, and they would not have been able to participate in the purchase of the new shares to be issued.
Perhaps it was these drastic cuts that ultimately prevented the process from ending successfully for Mercedes. They had probably gone too far. Of course, it was fascinating to see how, on
that day, they were able to free themselves from that situation, first partially and later completely. To ease the tension a little, in the end it was mainly thanks to a lawyer from Frankfurt,
Dr. Friedrich Matern, who represented the rights of the BMW dealers.
He received one share from one of the shareholders, which granted him the right to speak. He was angry enough, especially at this shareholders' meeting, to stall proceedings until Matern has carried out
some additional research. And for as long as that went on, things were quite lively at the annual shareholders' meeting. It wasn't until after an impromptu lunch break that Matern got a chance to speak.
He did not rant or provoke like the others, but asked factual questions, to which he received revealing answers.
The following picture emerged: The new Model 700 has been surprisingly well received. Also, his price was set at a level that was definitely a little higher than just covering costs. Somewhat surprisingly,
no attempt had been made to solicit a MAN-offer to take over the massive plant in Allach. Point by point, Matern demonstrated that certain BMW figures had been understated and costs overstated in the
balance sheet, all to force approval of the takeover by Daimler-Benz.
He skillfully criticized the entire proceedings of this shareholders' meeting and then presented MAN's offer to purchase Allach immediately and without further conditions for 30 million DM. He wanted to
maintain the 50 percent reduction in share values, but not the ban on shareholders purchasing new shares, with subscription rights, of course. So, despite the deduction of the debts, 60 million DM
was suddenly available for the absolutely essential mid-size car.
That was, in all likelihood, an additional motive for Mercedes to acquire BMW unconditionally. They wanted to get rid of a rival that was regaining its strength, a threat that
later history clearly demonstrated. And there was one person in the room who owned shares in both DB and BMW. He, likely inspired by Dr. Matern’s appearance, would rediscover his faith in BMW’s own
strength and actively support the company; major shareholder Herbert Quandt.
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